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Abstract. As products of both natural and social systems,
rivers are highly complex historical objects. We show in
this paper that historical analysis works on two different lev-
els: one level, which we call “structural”, shows the material-
ity of the riverine environment as the spatial-temporal prod-
uct of natural factors and human impacts (bed and course
alterations, pollution, etc.). On a second level –“semiotic” –
we show that river systems are also social constructs and the
subjects of ancient and diverse management practices. The
quality of a river will be a function of the dialectical inter-
action between both levels. Historical analysis can uncover
the inherited constraints that bear upon current management
practices. To help substantiate this analytical framework, we
analyse the case of the Moselle river in eastern France by us-
ing archival sources and statistical data. Severely impaired
by industrial discharges from iron, coal and salt industries
between the 1875s and the early 1980s, the waters of the
Moselle became the subject of a social consensus between
stakeholders that prevented the implementation of efficient
pollution management policies until the 1990s. The exam-
ple urges caution on the pervasiveness of participatory ap-
proaches to river management: social consensus does not
necessarily benefit the environment.
1 Introduction
The contemporary scientific literature on river systems calls
for a better understanding of the relationships between rivers
and society (Meybeck, 2002). This testifies to the powerful
social dynamics that shape natural objects. At all time and
space scales, the impact of human action on natural objects
and environments has been getting harder to neglect. The
floristic composition of forests, the strength of soil erosion in
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ancient times, the circulation of exogenous species, the pres-
ence of lead in Arctic ice all advocate a reassessment of how
we theorize, analyze and quantify human interaction with the
“natural” world. This is a complicated debate because it de-
velops at the borders of disciplinary fields. It is sometimes
difficult to reconcile the concerns and methods of the natural
scientists with those of the historians, the philosophers and
the sociologists. True interdisciplinarity in the environmen-
tal field is needed but hard to achieve.
Rivers are good objects on which to build interdisciplinary
research, as the existing literature shows (Petts et al., 1989;
Meybeck et al., 1998). History plays a great role in those re-
search initiatives. One reason is that, in the Western world,
there is generally a wealth of historical data available on
rivers. Very early, the significance of water for human set-
tlements transformed them in legal objects. Roman law de-
veloped a large corpus on water rights. Even in those coun-
tries where the legal system does not derive from Roman
law, the question of water property was never left unspeci-
fied. It was of considerable importance to know who was
entitled to withdraw water from a watercourse or a water ta-
ble; who had the right to modify the course of a river to create
mills or irrigation works; who was responsible for maintain-
ing the dykes and dams erected to protect the land against
floods, etc. As a consequence, public and private archives
alike are rich with ancient information about the representa-
tions, transformations and management of rivers1. Specifics
about water abstraction and channel geometry modifications
appeared as early as the Middle Ages. Data regarding wa-
ter quality appeared later, with the development of analytical
methods (end of the eigteenth century). In France, the de-
velopment of spas from the 1830s gave a decisive impetus to
the chemical analysis of water and the subsequent develop-
ment of adduction and sanitation networks made necessary
1For information about contemporary historical sources for en-
vironmental history in France see (Corvol, 1999, 2003).
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frequent water quality analyses which have been kept in the
archives. The expansion of water quality analyses has been
very great since the 1960s, when they were extended to all
waters (and not only those used for human consumption).
Other sources of data can be mobilized to study the histori-
cal evolution of rivers: e.g., field observations, aerial photog-
raphy, sediment sampling (Meybeck et al., 2007). However,
for contemporary river managers and river scientists, the re-
course to history may appear like a nice but somewhat super-
fluous addition to their core business and concerns. In this
paper, we would like to argue that a systematic exploration
of river history can shed light on many aspects of current
river dynamics and politics, especially for those rivers that
have been most transformed by human action.
This belief is grounded in a case study that was con-
ducted over five years in Eastern France, on the river Moselle
(Garcier, 2005). Over the course of thirty years at the
end of the nineteenth century, the Moselle underwent brutal
changes. It became the axis of a powerful industrial region,
saw its channel considerably remodelled and the quality of
its waters progressively degraded. We used archival sources
– among others – to reconstruct this transformation and pro-
vide some quantitative elements about it. But we also tried
to make sense of it: how could a river experience such mas-
sive changes without much debate? How come that the local
population and administrations quickly saw industrial pol-
lution as normal? What kind of management policies were
applied to remedy the problem and with what success? And
ultimately, can contemporary river management gain some
insight from this retrospective assessment?
We will first provide a theoretical overview on rivers as
historical objects and products of socio-natural systems. We
will then present the case of the Moselle. We will finally
introduce some conclusive comments on the use of historical
information to aid contemporary decision-making on river
management.
2 Rivers as socio-natural systems
In the twentieth century, historiography has undergone im-
portant changes that have affected the methods and the ob-
jects of historical enquiry. The main reformers of historical
practice are the members of the so-called “Annales School”,
among them Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, and later, Fernand
Braudel. Their approach promoted the use of adjunct sci-
ences to advance historical research. They were not hostile
to scientific inputs from anthropology, sociology and geog-
raphy and they favoured the use of a variety of information
sources. Most importantly, their scientific stance departed
from the traditional emphasis on events. As one prominent
member of the school puts it, this new approach “relegated
the sensational to the sidelines and was reluctant to give
a simple accounting of events, but strived on the contrary
to pose and solve problems and, neglecting surface distur-
bances, to observe the long and medium-term evolution of
economy, society and civilisation.” (Duby, 1990).
Observing the “long and medium-term evolution” requires
studying historical “structures”. The notion of structure is
widely used in the social sciences and humanities, though
its meaning varies. Here, by historical structure, we mean a
lasting mode of repartition and organization of social objects
and practices. In this historical model, events are a manifes-
tation of structures: no event can happen independently of
the structures uncovered by historical scrutiny. As a conse-
quence, no event is “random”, completely foreign to the way
societies are organized materially but also, culturally. It is
another contribution of the Annales school to have specified
that structures are not only material but mental as well. Each
region and time period has specific ways of thinking that fil-
ter experience and steer action or inaction. Accordingly, an
idea cannot spontaneously spring in any social structure: it is
always dependant on a certain context.
The influence of the Annales school on environmental his-
tory has been very great, because environmental change, un-
til recently, has been a “long and medium-term evolution”.
The new approach opened up the possibility to investigate
the historicity (i.e. historical character) of the environment
itself by using historical data. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s
Histoire du climat depuis l’an mil was the first attempt to use
textual data (e.g. the dates of wine harvests in the south of
France) to document natural climate variations over histori-
cal periods (Le Roy-Ladurie, 1988). The research done by
the Lyon’s group on river systems shares the same theoreti-
cal basis: by using a variety of data sources (geomorphologic
field observations, textual and cartographic archives, etc.),
it is possible to reconstruct the natural evolution of a wa-
tercourse over many centuries if not millenia (Roux, 1982;
Bravard, 1989; Girel, 1996; Bravard and Magny, 2002).
Environmental change modifies the whole fluvial system.
Rivers respond by reshaping their beds. Depending on water
conditions and the availability of sediments, a river will cut
its bed or expand it by aggradation.
Other research stances take up a slightly different ap-
proach; they insist on the impact of social structures and
economic development on the environment – see for exam-
ple Cronon (1992) and Williams (1992). The river “biogra-
phies‘” that have been published in the last fifteen years share
the same line of thought. In those works, the river system and
basin are not considered as the setting of historical events nor
are they considered as purely “natural” entities. Indeed, the
main driving force of change is human action, and especially,
industrialization and urbanization (Barca, 2007). Steinberg
has shown how the pristine waters of New England were “in-
corporated” into the cotton mills built by Bostonian capital-
ists in the early 1830s (Steinberg, 2001). Cioc studied the
case of the Rhine and the continuous stream of alterations
and modifications applied to the river channel and flow by
human action (Cioc, 2002). In an equally severe case but
different context, Gumprecht has analysed how the city of
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Los Angeles has slowly preyed upon the Los Angeles River,
diverting its waters and finally casting it into a casement of
concrete to prevent flood damage (Gumprecht, 2001). In all
cases, historians have shown that some rivers in the Western
world have been severely impacted by human action. Their
evolution is driven by socio-economic factors as much as by
natural ones.
This has been theorized by the sociologist Ulrich Beck in
his famous book Risk Society (Beck, 1992). Written in the
wake of the Chernobyl accident, Beck’s book was mainly
concerned with nuclear risk. However, Beck has shown more
generally that industrialization has brought, or “integrated”,
natural objects into the social world. Natural objects have
become technical elements within the industrial system: they
are one of the industrial production factors. This seminal idea
works extremely well when applied to rivers. With industri-
alization, the technical means to harness nature, the variety
of water uses, the quantity of water, the corrections applied to
channel geometry and of course water pollution have reached
levels never seen before. As a consequence, it has been in-
creasingly difficult to separate rivers from the social and geo-
graphical context in which they are enshrined because many
aspects of contemporary rivers, even some of their “natural”
dynamics, are driven by social demands and uses. This is
especially true on those rivers most transformed by human
action.
For such objects, it is irrelevant to speak of “natural” ob-
jects impacted by society. There is a complete interpene-
tration of the fluvial system and socio-economic system that
gives birth to another object that is neither natural nor so-
cial. On a more general stance, to account for environmental
impacts in rivers, it is rational to discard the Nature/society
dialectics that has been under heavy criticism for concep-
tual reasons2 and move forward towards a more integrative
framework. This framework would first of all concern itself
2Sociologist Bruno Latour has shown that even in the western
world, this divide was never as perfect and definitive as we like to
think it was (Latour, 1993, 2004). He argues that there have been
permanent and often unsuccessful efforts to insulate natural objects
and scientific facts and practices from the “contamination” of so-
cial values. In his view, scientific practices that have reinforced
the Cartesian distinction between Nature and society from the six-
teenth century onwards have never been free from social interfer-
ence. Accordingly, we cannot claim to have an absolute knowledge
of Nature, simply because Nature is socially constructed through
scientific practices that categorize arbitrarily objects and situations
as “natural” or “social”. In another strand of criticism, anthropolo-
gist Philippe Descola has shown that the relationship between peo-
ple and natural objects (e.g. wild animals) is negotiated in different
ways in different societies (Descola, 2001, 2005). Some societies
do not draw a sharp distinction between what belongs to the hu-
man and social world and what belongs to the natural world. Even
non-animated objects (river, trees) can have the same social stand-
ing as individuals. In other words, the distinction between Nature
and society is not anthropologically invariant across cultures but is
historically and socially constructed.
with all the material aspects of rivers. If archival data is rich
enough, historical analysis can provide many insights on the
material and spatial configuration of such socio-natural river
systems and on the flows of water and matter that transit
through them. This is where the concept of “anthroposys-
tem” is useful. An anthroposystem, according to M.A. San-
tos, “is an orderly combination or arrangement of physical
and biological environments for the purpose of maintaining
human civilization.” (Santos and Filho, 2005, p. 80). The
concept of anthroposystem describes the metabolism of the
river in a way that makes sense to the hydrologist, the geo-
chemist, the historian and the geographer. The concepts of
“anthroposystem” and “historical structures” have a strong
affinity because reasoning historically in terms of “struc-
tures” opens up the possibility of modelling and quantifica-
tion since a material structure can be rendered by a system3.
This affinity is obvious in the studies that analyse the past
metabolism of cities (Barles, 2002, 2007; Laakkonen and
Lehtonen, 1999).
However, beyond this “material” level of historical anal-
ysis, another level has to be taken into consideration. Some
younger members of the Annales School have argued that
historical structures do not only reside in material elements.
Some cultural elements are shared among people and consti-
tute mental structures – sets of values, of automatic thought
reflexes, of legitimate practices. In short, mental structures,
or “mentalite´s”, control what people collectively think and
collectively accept. A person is not always conscious of the
mental structures that categorize his or her thoughts. On a
personal level, however, a person can rebel against them.
On a more general scale, it is not the case and the ways of
thinking that are recurrent and dominant can be outlined by
historical analysis. Sharing some mental structures does not
mean that all social actors agree nor have the same interests
but they have an identical way of analysing a situation or re-
sponding to a problem. Mental structures encompass strug-
gle between interest groups: they provide a background and
the lines along which issues are debated. In other words,
mental structures frame social debate about issues, policies
or objects. They will endow some objects with certain sets
of values and rivers are no exception to the rule.
This is why the anthroposystem concept does not cap-
ture all the complexity of the social representations of rivers.
Rivers are not only material objects; they are also cultural
entities which interact with the social system. This is how
Richard White interprets the remaking of the Columbia River
as an “organic machine”. He explains that when Americans
were acting on the river, they were indeed “Emersonians”:
Ralph Waldo Emerson’s books provided the cultural back-
ground against which Americans could make sense of the
rivers that they were modifying to suit their needs. Harness-
ing the river’s power and organic cycles (most notably that of
3This idea was put forward by Raymond Boudon as early as
1968 (Boudon, 1968).
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Fig. 1. Conceptual model of pollution occurrence and control taking
organic pollution in Europe as an example. Source: after Meybeck
et al. (1989).
salmon) was a way to connect to the larger cycles of life and
nature (White, 1995). In another geographical setting, Philip
Scarpino states that link clearly:
“The transformation of the Upper Mississippi and
the Missouri Rivers that took place between the
mid-nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries
was solidly rooted in attitudes – in the way that
many Americans defined nature and the appropri-
ate relation between humans and nature. In this
way, rivers served as a metaphor for the larger
American environmental experience.” (Scarpino,
1997, p.2).
The same can be told of other rivers, which do not only
convey water but values also. The Rhine, for example, has
always been a strong symbol of German unity – and the
German Moselle itself benefited from the Third Reich Law
protecting landscapes meaningful for national identity, the
Landschaftsschutzgesetz of 1935 (Chaney, 1996). The rivers
in the most industrial parts of the French Moselle basin were
also endowed with sets of values. We possess archival evi-
dence of the specific status granted to these rivers and river
sections by industrialists and managers (see below). We do
not base our argument simply on wide historical inferences
but on actual textual evidence. Analyzing the representations
of rivers – the “images” people have of them – is useful be-
cause they have an impact on river use and management.
The image of a river can be invoked to dispel any change
or use deemed illegitimate and incompatible with it. In the
1990s, all plans to further dam the Loire river in France were
dropped in front of the fierce opposition from local popula-
tions and environmental activists putting forward the need to
protect the unique character of “the last wild river in Europe”.
We would call this level of historical analysis “semiotic”
because rivers are treated as signs conveying meanings or
values. The meaning presently controls what can be done on
or with the watercourse. Accordingly, river management is
not only a matter of conscious decisions and objective ratio-
nality: it also depends on the mental structures and the image
of the river stakeholders have. When we judge that a river has
been badly managed, the explanation is not necessarily scien-
tific ignorance or the incompetence of river managers. It may
be that the conditions of possibility of a good management
could not be met because of an inadequate legal framework,
of specific power relations inside the river basin or because of
incompatible mental structures. Political decision-making is
not a simple, linear process and in the long run river manage-
ment is the dialectical product of a combination of material
processes, socio-economic factors and mental structures.
3 Applying the conceptual model: the example of water
quality of the Moselle
These general considerations can be readily translated into
concrete research practices. The case of the pollution of the
Moselle is an interesting real-life example because it was the
outcome of an interplay between radical structural changes
brought by industrialization and the development of new at-
titudes towards the river itself. In the second part of the
nineteenth century, the socio-economic specialization in the
drainage basin changed dramatically from agricultural activ-
ities to heavy industry. The Moselle and many smaller rivers
in its drainage basin were modified to suit industrial needs.
The quality of surface waters in the basin was of course ad-
versely impacted by these developments. We tried to quan-
tify this negative impact and identify the material and mental
structures that made it possible or gave birth to it. Finally, we
tried to link the material data (“how much pollution?”) with
the political reaction and management initiatives that were
taken at the time.
3.1 A conceptual model of pollution level
To this purpose, we used a model proposed by Michel Mey-
beck and al. that links pollution discharge, economic de-
velopment and political reaction (Fig. 1). Two categories of
variables influence pollution level. On the one side, aggra-
vating factors such as population and economic growth (and
especially, industrial growth); on the other, limiting factors
such as the presence of sewage plants or the implementation
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of efficient control strategies (pollution taxation, for exam-
ple). This conceptual model assumes some kind of link be-
tween the pollution level and the political reaction since in-
flexion points appear at certain moments in time and give
birth to various scenarios. However, it does not specify the
nature of this link: how does the pollution level influence
the decision process that leads to management initiatives? In
turn, what is the impact of management strategies on pollu-
tion levels? And more generally, would historical hindsight
back up the model assumptions? My point here is that on the
Moselle, there is no direct connection between the objective
level of pollution and the social and administrative response
to it, because it is not because people “become aware” of
a problem that it will be solved – precisely because of the
inertia of historical structures, whether material or mental.
Polluting a river is socially acceptable if its only value is to
serve as an industrial tool.
The data sources used to specify the model are diverse.
France has a tradition of public administration of natural ob-
jects. This derives from Gallic legal idiosyncrasies, most no-
tably the eminent role of the centralised State as a landowner.
Moreover, through law, the State – and not the judge – is
the primary socio-spatial regulator. The State is the rightful
owner of all rivers deemed “floatable and navigable” (for an
overview of history of the French water law, see (Gazzaniga
et al., 1998)). It does not own the water, which in French law
has always been “res communis” – the property of all – but
it owns the banks and the bed. For smaller rivers that can be
privately appropriated, the State still has a right to validate
the use owners make of water because he should guarantee
the mutual compatibility between all the water uses of a river.
Accordingly, vast amounts of technical and management data
on rivers can be found in the public archives kept in every
“de´partement”. The continuity of the State from the early
monarchies to contemporary day through the Revolution-
ary period enables one to have spectacular historical depth.
To reconstruct the modifications applied to river beds in the
Moselle basin, we primarily used reports from the civil engi-
neers’ bodies in charge of the management of rivers. These
reports sometimes provide more general overviews on water
uses in a “de´partement” or on a river and sometimes include
statistical data. Two main bodies have been in charge of river
management. For the smaller watercourses (“non-navigable
and non-floatable”), it has been the corps of the Ge´nie rural
et des Eaux et Foreˆts. For the larger watercourses (i.e. “float-
able and navigable”), the corps of the Ponts et Chausse´es and
more specifically, the Service de la navigation have taken re-
sponsibility. In the Moselle basin, however, there have never
been such influential engineers as Tulla on the Rhine (whose
action is thoroughly analysed by Blackbourn (2006, pp. 76–
119)). Two reasons explain this. First, the chief engineers
have to move periodically to other parts of the country to pre-
vent their being involved in local politics and compromises.
Second, there has never been on the Moselle such a service as
the Service spe´cial du Rhoˆne which guarantees a long lasting
river management philosophy, beyond individual people.
Other public technical bodies (first, the Inspection du Tra-
vail then the Corps des Mines) have been in charge of the
overview of industrial activities. Since 1810, France has had
a legal framework that categorizes industrial activities ac-
cording to their level of nuisance. Three categories have been
created and for the first two, public authorization is necessary
to create a plant. An order of the prefect (the representative
of the State in every “de´partement”) allows an industrialist
to proceed with the construction of the plant but specifies by
what norms the plant operation should abide. The demands
of the industrialists, the technical documentation they pro-
vided, the answers of the technical bodies and the prefect
can all be found in the public archives, where they are clas-
sified on a communal basis. They provide a very interesting
source of information on industrial discharges. Moreover,
the technical bodies in charge of the industrial sector were
responsible for the compilation of production statistics. Pro-
duction statistics are also available for publicly owned com-
panies most notably Charbonnages de France, the coal pro-
duction monopoly created by the nationalisation and merger
of independent mining companies after World War II (HBL,
1993; Haby, 1965).
For private companies, the situation is more complicated,
because even if they still exist, they seldom have archives
available for historical research. One exception is the steel
company Arcelor, which set up a specific archival service,
gathering all the archives from the various steel companies
that merged over the years (referred to in this paper as “Es-
pace Archives Arcelor”).
Finally, since World War II, France has devised numerous
national and regional development strategies to compensate
for territorial inequality and especially for the weight of the
region of Paris. These strategies were translated into poli-
cies at the regional level. In face of vigorous industrial and
urban growth, water was becoming a limiting factor of re-
gional development in the 1950s. To forestall that ominous
prospect, public authorities devised the 1964 Water Law that
created basin agencies and water taxes based on polluter-pay
principles. The Rhin-Meuse basin agency has been, since its
debuts, a huge provider of data on water and watercourses.
They have been in charge of the equipment of the basin with
sewage treatment plants and large amounts of documentation
are available in their archives.
3.2 Industrialization, evolution of historical structures and
water pollution issues in the Moselle basin
The Moselle is the main tributary to the Rhine. Its river
basin has a surface of 28 280 sq km and is shared between
three countries. France has slightly more than 50% of the
basin, and most of the headwaters. Luxembourg has 15%
of the basin, through sovereignty over most of the river Suˆre
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Fig. 2. The drainage basin of the Moselle.
(Sauer) 4. Germany has the lower course of the river, down
to the confluence with the Rhine, at the Deutsches Eck (“Ger-
man Corner”) in the city of Koblenz (Fig. 2).
3.2.1 From the agrarian to the industrial river
Historically speaking, the Moselle has been documented by
text archives since Roman times. It was then an important
axis of circulation between the North and the South of Eu-
rope and the city of Trier, in contemporary Germany, was the
capital of the province of Belgium. A long poem by Auso-
4In this paper, we generally use the French names of the rivers.
However, we will also provide the German names when appropri-
ate.
nius (fourth century) dedicated to the river provides the first
known mention of water mills in Europe, an indication of the
ancientness of human action on the river itself (Bloch, 1935).
The Moselle, however, was never modified significantly be-
fore industrial times, because of hydro-geomorphological
constraints and historical circumstances. The river carried
a large amount of bed-load that proved to be a severe ob-
stacle to fluvial navigation and human settlement. The river
was constantly changing its course on its flood plain, acquir-
ing a reputation of “treachery” and making itself extremely
difficult to control (Le Masson and Le Joindre, 1835). Nav-
igation was further impeded by the political segmentation of
the river after the demise of the Carolingian Empire (ninth
century). All local authorities levied large tolls on naviga-
tion, providing a strong disincentive to the development of
commercial flows and making any project of course rectifica-
tion irrelevant. Quite paradoxically, the Lorraine region was
not organized around its main river. Local uses were dom-
inant: the river served as a source of fish and its floodplain
was used to raise cattle. As a consequence, before the 1850s,
most rivers in the Moselle basin, including the Moselle itself,
were in a subpristine state5. Fish was plentiful and renowned
and the riparian landscapes were celebrated - specifically in
the German part of the basin, where the Moselle meanders in
vine-covered gorges. The only exception in the basin was the
Saar river in Germany. In the Saar region, coal mining was an
ancient activity that received a new impetus under the lead-
ership of the Counts of Nassau-Saarbru¨cken (mid-eighteenth
century). In the 1820s, after the merger of all mines into a
single organisation overseen by the Prussian state, produc-
tion reached an industrial scale. The introduction of steam
engines in mines allowed for the creation of new mine pits
and the expansion of existing ones through the pumping out
of underground waters. The spatial and quantitative expan-
sion of mining activities had a strong impact on the regional
environment. The first reported consequences were soil sub-
sidence and the disappearance of springs, which forced the
local authorities to encourage a centralised water distribu-
tion system (Kraemer, 1999). Later, in the 1850s, induced
activities such as iron production began to impact adversely
the quality of the Saar in Germany (Du¨lmen and Labouvie,
1992).
In the French part of the basin, industrial development
happened later than in Saarland but with spectacular strength
and rapidity (Bour, 1995), bringing unforeseen structural
changes to the region and the river. Industrial growth was
based on the three valuable ores that can be found in Lorraine
(see Fig. 3): coal, iron and salt. The coal seam in France is in
the continuity of that of the Saar and was mined industrially
5Some exceptions are documented in the grievances books re-
quested by the Revolutionary power in 1789. For examples, some
stakeholders of the Fensch river complained about the impact of
mining and proto-industrial activities of the Wendel ironworks, but
these complaints remained extremely local.
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from the 1840s. In the east of the region can be found mas-
sive amounts of low-content iron deposits. The local pig-iron
industry, located in the mining areas, transformed itself into
a very powerful steel industry after the technical process to
eliminate the phosphorus contained in the local ore fell into
the public domain in 1893. Finally, the geological salt de-
posits found in the region served as raw material for various
chemical industries, the most notable being the soda plants
using the Solvay process (founded between 1871 and 1910).
Other industries had developed earlier, and locally, their im-
pacts were significant. At the head of the basin, the Vosges
mountains provided good conditions for the textile industry.
After the annexation of Alsace and the northern part of Lor-
raine by Germany in 1871, this industry received technical,
human and financial support from the Alsatian industrialists
who had decided to leave Alsace to remain in France.
The industrialization process triggered three main lines of
structural changes for the rivers in the basin. First of all, a
large majority of the new plants favoured locations close to
the watercourses because they needed the proximity of wa-
ter. Water served as an input in some industrial processes
(steam production for example), as a cooling fluid and also,
as the receptacle of industrial effluents. From the 1850s, all
newly created plants in the Moselle basin were located in
close proximity to the watercourses. This profoundly modi-
fied the riparian landscapes, specifically in those areas where
industrial clusters developed around specific industries (steel,
soda, etc.). Moreover, it increased competition for water
between existing users and the new large industrial plants.
When arbitration was needed, the advantage was often given
to the most capital-intensive users. This process can be seen
as early as the 1860s in Saarland: at this date, a paper mill in
Dillingen filed a lawsuit against the steel factory of the same
city, which was consuming most of water of the Prims and
polluted the rest in such a fashion as to make the production
of paper impossible. The paper mill lost its lawsuit, which
brings Richard Van Du¨lmen and Eva Labouvie to say:
“From that period, the water needs of a paper mill
had to yield in front of those of a heavy industrial
plant.” (Du¨lmen and Labouvie, 1992, p. 67)
Second, the industry needed enhanced transportation, be-
cause it imported some raw products and exported much of
its production to other parts of the country or abroad. Rail-
way played a role but other cheaper alternatives were also
considered and especially the building of canals. From the
1870s, there was a constant drive to upgrade the canal sys-
tem in the region. The notorious “Freycinet plan” of 1879
planned to build 1400 km of canals in France, a large part
of them in industrial areas. From then on, the Moselle itself
underwent constant rectification works to suit the needs of
the industry (Cermakian, 1975). The most telling example is
the Canal des Mines de Fer de la Moselle that was opened in
1932. The canal was built by private interests to bring in coke
imported from the Ruhr and export iron products to the Bel-
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of the Moselle.
gian and Dutch ports through the Rhine system. It consisted
of two sections: one was built in the Moselle floodplain, par-
allel to rhe river; the other used the river channel itself that
was thoroughly dredged. The drive for canalization went fur-
ther and in 1964, Rhine-type barges could navigate upstream
up to Nancy6. The rectification process proved detrimental
to water quality, because it disrupted the dynamics of natural
self-purification by removing riparian forests and wetlands.
The third structural change that affected the region and
the river was the growth and spatial reallocation of popu-
lation. The region lacked unskilled workers and the indus-
trialists and mines had to organize immigration networks to
bring workers from Poland, Belgium and Italy first and from
Northern Africa after World War II. Some cities in the most
industrial parts of the basin experienced spectacular growth.
This called for a complete upheaval of urban water provision,
since the traditional modes of water provision and evacuation
6Before that, only 350 tonnes barges could navigate on all of the
canal system. From 1964, the waterway was open to 1200 tonnes
barges.
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were quickly outpaced by the rhythm of urban expansion.
Water was essential for urban growth. In the mushroom cities
created by industrial activities, it became standard to have ac-
cess to large amounts of flowing water for domestic and ur-
ban uses. Waste waters were then rejected without treatment
into the natural environment through the sewer systems that
were extensively built in the region between 1870 and 1950.
In 1946, a study counted only three existing urban waste wa-
ter treatment plants in the whole Moselle basin, two of which
had been out of order for at least six years. Quite predictably
given the experience of other cities in France, England or
Germany, the development of urban hygiene in the cities of
the Moselle basin resulted in severe degradation of the wa-
tercourses by organic pollution of domestic origin. Figure 4
illustrates the changes brought about to the existing spatial
structure of population in the basin between the 1851 and the
1946 census. The main axis of the river system, the large
cities and the industrial basins concentrated most of the pop-
ulation growth. The more rural areas in the centre and in the
west of the basin experienced depopulation. The net result
was a changing geography of pollution, with increased ur-
ban pressure on watercourses in those areas where industrial
pressures were already very high.
However, there was another type of change induced by
industrialization. The coming of age of a powerful indus-
try progressively modified the “semiotic” status of rivers for
local societies. The transformation of rivers from natural
objects into industrial tools was gradually vindicated in the
region. Around the 1870s, there still were strong debates
about the legitimacy of industrial impacts. An inge´nieur de
la navigation gave this warning about the proposed creation
of chemical plants on the river Meurthe:
“Should the Meurthe receive without restriction
the waste waters of all these plants (how harmless
should any individual discharge be), this pure and
limpid river would very soon be profoundly altered
[in French: de´nature´e] and could not provide any-
more the riverside residents with the services from
which they benefit today and are entitled to.” 7
The city of Nancy, located downstream of a proposed plant,
notified its disagreement too:
“The municipal administration is convinced that
this project would have the direst consequences for
our city. Under a first layer of vegetal earth, the
Meurthe valley is filled, on all of its length, by a
layer of granitic sand and gravel which thickness
varies between 3 and 10 m. This layer of rather
pure alluvium contains the underground water ta-
ble which supplies water to the population of the
valley and especially to a large part of the popula-
tion of Nancy.” 8
However, these projects were allowed to proceed, for two
main raisons. The first one is that some stakeholders found
technical solutions to accomodate the new factories. For ex-
ample, the city of Nancy turned to other sources of drink-
able water and started to discharge in the Meurthe the un-
treated waste waters collected by the sewer system it built in
the 1880s. The second reason is that industrial development
was seen as more important than the preservation of streams
themselves. Instrumental rationality justified the artificializa-
tion of the river system. By 1910s, barely a voice contested
the legitimacy of the industrial “take-over” of the rivers, be-
cause of the economic importance of the industry itself, but
also because preserving the streams was not an overwhelm-
ing concern. The stream had no value in itself. This was the-
orized by German scientists working in the Rhine basin. The
7Archives de´partementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle, file 5 M 167.
Chief Engineer’s opinion, in: Report of the Inge´nieur ordinaire
de la navigation on the creation of a potassium cyanide plant in
Laneuveville-devant-Nancy, 16 December 1871.
8Archives de´partementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle, file 5 M 167.
Observations adresse´es a` M. le Pre´fet de Meurthe-et-Moselle [...]
relatives au projet de la fondation d’une usine de produits chimiques
a` la Neuveville, Paris, Seringe Fre`res, 1872, p. 5.
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best known of them, Curt Weigelt, was originally working as
a fish expert in Alsace. He was the first to study methodically
the impact of industrial effluents on fish life (Weigelt, 1885).
However, by 1900, he was hired away by the German Chemi-
cal Industry Syndicate (Buschenfeld, 1997, p. 71) and started
to write scientific pieces favourable to industrial discharges.
He introduced the concept of Opferstrecke (“sacrificed sec-
tion”). His work was translated into French and was known
by river managers in Lorraine, on both sides of the border.
Here is what Weigelt meant by “sacrificed section”:
“Every time that a process capable of purify-
ing the wastewaters cannot be implemented be-
cause of its excessive cost, it should be allowed
to sacrifice a section of the stream to the par-
tially treated wastewaters, in order to make use of
self-purification. However, this sacrifice cannot be
made in favour of raw, untreated waste. In gen-
eral, the maximal length of such a sacrificed sec-
tion should not exceed three kilometres.” (Weigelt,
1903, p. 556)
This concept was put to use in the Ruhr region as early
as 1904 and very soon, its scope expanded beyond its initial,
fairly prudent, formulation. The river Emscher was modi-
fied to become a major industrial wastewater collector (Held,
2002). This functional view of rivers was also present in the
Moselle basin (most notably on the Fensch and the Orne)
and the “sacrificed section” model endorsed by the Admin-
istration. In 1910, for example, here is how an industrialist
describes the visit made by a German expert on the Fensch
to assess the seriousness of water pollution:
“The baron of Richthofen [the expert] has been
very amiable with us. He repeated again and again
that he knew exactly and had known for a long time
the situation on the Fensch. Industry, he said, cer-
tainly contributes a large part to the impurities dis-
charged in the Fensch but from another standpoint,
without the industry, what would have become of
the entire region?”9
The concept legitimated the devolution of river portions to
industrial pollution when no other economically sensible so-
lution was available to preserve industrial prosperity10. Later
9Espace Archives Arcelor, file V10/150. Account of the field
visit of 20 April 1910, 18 May 1910, p. 9.
10We cannot provide here a detailed comparison of the French
and German pollution management models. They were not very
different because they shared the same legal basis. When Germany
annexed a significant portion of Lorraine and the totality of Alsace
in 1871, French law was granted the status of local law. The French
laws prohibiting pollution or enacting administrative oversight of
industrial operations were still valid. It was only progressively and
not even fully that French law was replaced by local laws devised by
the local parliament of the Reichsla¨nder of Lothringen and Elsaß.
on, the functionalization of rivers was theorized even further
and granted a moral and aesthetic status. In the conclusion of
a book commissioned in 1932 by the Commerce and Industry
Chamber of the city of Metz to celebrate the completion of
the Canal des Mines de Fer de la Moselle, the author writes:
“And now, we will go see the finished works. Some
will regret the modification of a familiar landscape.
[...] But the consideration of the wealth, the jobs,
the affluence brought to our region by the com-
pleted works will console the poet, the fisherman
and the stroller alike. And then, will the landscape
be less beautiful? [...] Some landscapes are di-
vine, some are artistic but some others are simply
human. They bring about, more than others, work
and travel; they induce, as much as others, medi-
tation. Some have said, maybe with a little pom-
posity, that factories were cathedrals of labour and
they have been celebrated by a poet, the poet of
sprawling cities, of the great Flemish towns [Emile
Verhaeren]. Likewise, canals are rivers of labour;
and these rivers are beautiful.” (Houpert, 1932,
p. 172)
It could be argued that these examples are partisan expres-
sions of economic interest and ways of advocating changes
that were only profitable for a wealthy minority. However,
these attitudes towards the rivers were widely shared and
proved historically long-lasting. The radical transformations
brought to socio-spatial structures and river functions meant
that those stakeholders (peasants, fishermen, etc.) who had
an interest in preserving the agrarian Moselle were progres-
sively replaced and outnumbered by those (the majority of
population) who benefited from industrial prosperity. For the
latter, the river was an essential part of a larger scheme, of
the great industrial narrative of Lorraine which had been cel-
ebrated at the beginning of the twentieth century by the likes
of Laffitte (1912) and de Launay (1912). It became very dif-
ficult to criticize an industry that had brought prosperity to
a poor region and that was a cornerstone of French military
security, scientific progress and national pride. For exam-
ple, the iron used to build the Eiffel Tower in 1889 came
from the Pompey plant, right by the Moselle. Lorraine, more
generally, served as a display of all the attributes of French
modernity in front of the perceived menace of Germany. In
this context, the standing of the Moselle and its tributaries as
objects of discourse changed alongside their structural char-
acteristics. Once firmly in place, the functional vision of the
Moselle as a backbone of industrial development was very
difficult to reverse and it had a strong impact on pollution
management.
3.2.2 How much pollution was there?
These historical developments explain, to a large part, the
increase in water pollution since the 1850s: the objective
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pollution discharged into the streams from industrial and do-
mestic sources was vindicated by the strong economic and
symbolic status acquired by heavy industry and by evolv-
ing social values invested in rivers themselves. On these
grounds, all pollution management strategies stumbled on
the objective and semiotic factors linking industry and rivers.
Figure 5 provides a summary of organic pollution dis-
charges in the French Moselle basin (including the French
portion of the Sarre basin) since 1850. It is a rendition
of Meybeck’s curve applied to historical organic pollution.
A few provisos have to be made. The unit of measure is
the Population-equivalent (Pe), which is an aggregated index
widely used in sanitation projects11. The great advantage of
using this index is that it enables one to compare domestic
and industrial pollution. Domestic pollution was obtained
by collecting census data. We considered that before 1965
all waste waters were rejected in the environment without
11The definition of the Population-equivalent is variable across
countries and time periods. Here we follow the French practice
of the 1980s and consider that one Population-equivalent is the
equivalent of a daily discharge of 180 litres of wastewater contain-
ing: 57 grammes of BOD5, 135 g of COD, 9.9 g of nitrogen and
3.5 g of phosphorus. Article 2 of the European Council Directive
91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 “concerning urban waste-water treat-
ment” simplifies the definition by considering that one Population-
equivalent is worth a daily discharge of 60 g of BOD5.
treatment. This provides a high estimate for the years be-
fore 1870, because we consider that domestic waste waters
were rejected directly into the streams by the sewer system,
whereas in fact, sanitation networks were less common than
cesspools at the time. After 1965, the construction of some
large treatment plants began, removing an increasing propor-
tion of pollution by direct discharge. To evaluate organic
pollution of industrial origin, we used production statistics
found in the archives for the most polluting industrial sec-
tors: iron industry and coal mining. The equivalency ra-
tios between actual industrial pollution and its measurement
in Population-equivalent were drawn from a document pub-
lished by the basin agency in 196512. The dotted lines indi-
cate a tendency when the data is too sparse to provide robust
values. The plain line indicates values given by the basin
agency itself in published documentation.
Mineral and toxic pollution are not included in the chart.
Mineral pollution in the basin originates in the calcium chlo-
ride discharges in the Meurthe by the small numbers of soda
making plants located south of Nancy in Dombasle. The pol-
lution curve for these plants would be somewhat different,
showing a succession of plateaux, because the amount of
soda the plants have been allowed to produce and the amount
of salty compounds they have been allowed to discharge have
always been precisely defined by administrative procedures.
In 1873, the Solvay soda plant made a total of 3300 tons
of soda. By 1904, the combined production of all the soda
plants reached 206 000 tons13. Toxic pollution is impossible
to chart, because no consistent data has been collected before
the mid-1980s. This absence is surprising. The production of
toxical compounds (phenols, cyanides) by the iron and coke
industries has been documented since the end of nineteenth
century. However, using proxy techniques to document the
evolution of toxic and heavy metal pollution (as do Meybeck
et al., 2007) would probably be difficult, because most indus-
trial rivers in the basin have been dredged and recalibrated
a number of times. We lack the undisturbed settling ponds
needed to measure heavy metals loads in sediments. Further
studies would be needed to build the toxic pollution curve.
The organic pollution curve has two modes. A high point
was reached just before World War I, when industrial devel-
opment in the basin was buoyant. World War I brought things
to a halt since the northern part of the basin was very close
to the combat zones and industrial infrastructures were de-
stroyed during the conflict. Recovery was impeded by the
economic crises of the 1920s and 1930s then by World War
II. Between 1919 and 1945, the economy did not substan-
tially grow and the pollution level was accordingly fairly sta-
ble. It did not reach its 1913 mark before the beginning of
12This document is kept at the Archives de´partementales de
Meurthe-et-Moselle, file W 1245 99.
13Statistics kept at the Archives de´partementales de Meurthe-et-
Moselle, file 1485 W 29. For other soda files, see 5 M 152, VC
4456, W 1245 115.
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the 1950s. After that date, strong economic and industrial
growth induced a sharp increase of pollution.
The highest level of organic pollution in the basin was
reached at the beginning of the 1960s. After that date, the de-
cline of pollution owes to the reduction of domestic effluent
(all the more remarkable because population numbers were
still going up at the time). Organic pollution of industrial
origin was abated more slowly until 1990. At that date, the
rythm of pollution reduction increased. Today, organic pol-
lution levels are probably lower than they were in the 1860s.
However, it is striking to see that high levels of pollution
were not a sufficient factor to trigger a strong political re-
action. The high point reached at the beginning of the 1910s
was not matched with an adequate control strategy, partly be-
cause the weight of structural and semiotic factors impeded
its implementation.
3.3 Management issues
The Moselle pollution case is paradoxical because in France
there was a variety of legal dipositions prohibiting the alter-
ation of streams. The fishing law of 1829 and the decree
of 1897 concerning the protection of fish forbid the use of
poison to catch fish. The decree of 15 October 1810 on in-
dustrial factories (see page 1735) and its subsequent modifi-
cations (in 1917 and 1976) incorporated detailed provisions
on the discharge of industrial wastewaters. Some ad hoc pre-
fectoral orders were taken as early as the 1870s to protect fish
from industrial discharges in the most preserved areas of the
basin14. It cannot be said, accordingly, that river managers
were “unaware” of water pollution. The legal dispositions
were simply inadequate to prevent an increase of pollution.
A first element of explanation is that the existing legisla-
tion did not elaborate on what was “industrial water pollu-
tion”. The word itself never appeared in the actual texts. All
endeavours to enact a new national framework specifically
for water pollution issues failed repeatedly in 1911, 1920,
1923, 1932 and again in 1949 (Garcier, 2005, pp. 209–212).
The existing laws used to control pollution were intrinsically
contradictory. The fish laws considered the introduction of
nefarious substances into the streams as a criminal behaviour,
because it was a technique used by fish poachers. At the
same time, the industrial legislation inaugurated by the de-
cree of 1810 vindicated the discharge of industrial effluents
if they respected some rather arbitrary norms. The result was
a legal aporia, where the Administration endorsed industrial
discharges while condemning their impact on fish.
There was in Lorraine no real feeling of urgency to-
wards industrial pollution because between the 1870s and the
1910s, most stakeholders assumed that advances in science
and technology would be able to solve the problems created
by contemporary industry, especially for those industrial sec-
14Archives de´partementales des Vosges, files 329 S 1 and 20 M
30.
tors that incorporated a lot of science and research (e.g. steel
making and mineral chemistry). Medical and technical pub-
lications mention various experiments to recover industrial
waste, e.g. Freycinet (1868). There was a widespread al-
chemistic belief that some monetary value resided into indus-
trial waste, much as faecal matter could be transformed into
fertilizer or tar into aniline with a profit. Some new techni-
cal processes were needed to remove waste products. In the
meantime, settling ponds or basins were advocated. The use
of alkaline additives was recommended to tamper acids in ex-
cess. The lack of apparent interest in doing technical research
on pollution was compounded by that widely shared belief
that domestic wastewaters were more of a problem than in-
dustrial effluents. In his celebrated Traite´ d’hygie`ne indus-
trielle, the Professor Le´on Poincare´, a professor of public
hygiene at the university of Nancy and a admirer of Pasteur’s
work on microbes, wrote:
“The discharge of waste in the rivers is much
more dangerous than the discharge of industrial
wastewaters.” (Poincare´, 1886, p. 13)
In this context, the formulation of the concept of river “self-
purification” (in William Ripley Nichols’ work on the Merri-
mack and Blackstone rivers in 1879) provided a strong sup-
port for the loose application of water pollution regulations.
What need was there to treat industrial effluents if rivers
could do it for free?
In any case, the application of prohibitory dispositions
towards pollution would still have been extremely difficult.
The Administration did not have the means to conduct sys-
tematic controls. Proving that a specific factory was to be
blamed for inordinate water pollution was extremely diffi-
cult. In the 1920s, the creation of new coking facilities on
the Orne and the Fensch had a dramatic impact on the aquatic
fauna: some river sections became entirely devoid of life. On
the Moselle itself, the creation of coking facilities in Pont-
a`-Mousson and Thionville between 1923 and 1925 imper-
iled the fish stock15. The existence of an industrial cluster
made the identification of culprits an impossible task. In
this context, the industrialists could go on with legal and ille-
gal discharges without much concern. Some of them simply
avoided being caught red-handed:
“We still discharge in the Fensch the wastewaters
of the pickling plants [...], which give a red color
to the waters of the Fensch for some time after the
emptying of the tanks. We will start operate in a
few days a new tank for acid waters, which will
allow us to discharge only during the night. This
will not prevent the pollution of the river, but will
make it less visible.”16
15Archives de´partementales de Moselle, file 5 S 10.
16Espace Archives Arcelor, file V10/77, Letter of the director of
the Wendel factory of Fenderie to the Central Bureau in Hayange,
10 June 1924.
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Some fishermen associations indeed sued individual pol-
luters for fish poisoning. However, the fishermen never con-
tested the legitimacy of the industry. It was simply the al-
leged fraudulency of some discharges and their financial im-
pact for the fishermen associations that were at stake. The
few industrialists that were confronted on these issues did
not hesitate to either buy the fishermen associations’ silence
or blackmail the Administration, as in this excerpt from a let-
ter sent by the director of a major paper mill to an inge´nieur
des Eaux et Foreˆts:
“If the prefectoral order [prohibiting pollution] is
ever used to file a lawsuit against us, we will close
the Clairefontaine Paper Mills, and we will only re-
open it when we are certain that we can go on with
our production without being exposed to a bullying
we cannot tolerate anymore. The Administration
will have to take sides and state clearly if the ac-
tivity of a factory that employs 1100 workers, pays
seven millions of salaries and pays the State one
million in taxes is less important than the grous-
ing of [the president of the fishermen association
of Raon].”17
The Administration yielded to this type of pressure for polit-
ical reasons, in a context where the semiotic status of rivers
made water alteration a legitimate option. In the 1980s, such
attitudes towards pollution and the rivers were still prevalent
– a clear sign of their long-lasting influence of river man-
agement. Here is an excerpt of a meeting at the pre´fecture
of Meurthe-et-Moselle held in 1982 between the prefect and
representatives of a soda maker:
“Mr. Montfort [CEO of Solvay France]: “Solvay
feel they are attacked from all sides, except perhaps
by the Administration. If we have to reduce pol-
lution effectively, we will probably have to close
one of the plants on the Meurthe and dismiss half
of the workforce, to 1500 workers. Or maybe, the
Administration could suspend the orders enjoining
the soda factories to reduce pollution. [...]
The prefect remarks that the Administration has al-
ways adopted a soft stance on this issue, for ex-
ample by differing the application of the orders
requiring a decrease in discharges by 1st January
1981.”18
After World War II, there was however an small evolu-
tion of the semiotic status of rivers, and most importantly,
of pollution itself. At the end of the 1940s, some civil engi-
neers had begun to worry about water provision in the region
17Archives de´partementales des Vosges, file 8 M 214. Letter of
the director of the Clairefontaine Paper Mills to the Chief Inge´nieur
des Eaux et Foreˆts, 7 June 1929.
18Archives de´partementales de Moselle, file 1497 W 117. Min-
utes of the meeting with Solvay France, SA, 11 February 1982.
(Brunotte and Wargnier, 1949). Consumption was rapidly
increasing due to economic and population growth and the
refurbishment of distribution networks. In the foreseeable
future, some shortages were to be feared. It fuelled a de-
mand for water expertise and between 1949 and 1957 the
State’s technical bodies conducted studies on the regional
water budget19. They showed that pollution was a factor of
shortage because it impeded the use of some water resources.
Pollution was rapidly growing and could not be seen as a
criminal – i.e. deviant – behaviour anymore: pollution was a
structural element of the water budget and a limiting factor
to further industrial expansion. Controlling chronic pollution
was a precondition of continued prosperity. A new pollution
management strategy was devised which hinged on strategic
planning of sectoral water uses and polluter-pay principle.
The Water Law of 1964, which created the basin agencies,
provided the legal framework required to enforce this new
strategy. The basin agencies produce five-year strategic plans
which lay out all the investments and policy initiatives pro-
grammed in the basin. The plans are financed by pollution
and water abstraction taxes nominally paid by all water users
in the basin except farmers. The level of the taxes is voted
by a basin committee which includes representatives of the
State, of water users and of basin stakeholders (environmen-
talists, for example). Even if the polluter-pay principle has
been invoked from the start as the conceptual basis for tax-
ation, the level of the taxes has never been high enough to
become a true incentive. Until the 1990s, tax revenue was
dimensioned to provide exactly the amount necessary to fi-
nance the wastewater plant equipment plan: pollution control
was based on the mutualisation of the financing of pollution
abatement equipment and not on cost internalisation incen-
tives through taxation.
However, the Moselle was still strictly viewed as a source
of water and the managers’ aim was to insure mutual com-
patibility between all water uses within the basin. It allowed
for the building of dams in the upper reaches of the basin: the
goal was to limit the seasonal variations of hydraulicity so as
to dilute pollution as much as possible. In direct accordance
with the weight of historical structures, it was socially more
acceptable to further modify the river than to act vigorously
on pollution sources.
Two other points are worth noting. First, and despite all
claims to the contrary from the river managers, it was not
environmental concerns that gave birth to the basin agen-
cies and the new tax-based policy instruments but the need
to make sure that water shortages would not undermine the
growth of the urban-industrial system in France. Second,
the basin agency had to take into account the industrial con-
sensus existing in the Moselle basin. In the beginning the
19Archives de´partementales de Meurthe-et-Moselle, file W 1245
111. See for example Socie´te´ d’e´tudes pour l’alimentation en eau
de l’Est de la France, “Alimentation en eau du bassin lorrain”, In-
ventaire des besoins en eau, 1957.
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agency’s legitimacy was very low and it met wide ranging
opposition from a variety of basin stakeholders (industrialists
and mayors in particular). In the basin committee, environ-
mentalists and individual consumers were underrepresented.
The basin committee and the basin agency management were
very sensitive to the pressures exerted by the most powerful
polluters in favour of the existing industrial consensus. In the
1970s, in the wake of the industrial crisis that undermined the
economic base, the industrialists were able to negotiate only
modest increases and spatial modulation of pollution taxes.
As a consequence, until 1990, the overall decrease in organic
pollution in the basin came from domestic pollution abate-
ment (see Fig. 5).
The lasting presence of the industrial consensus began to
crumble when a series of factors took momentum. The first
one was the industrial crisis which challenged the industry’s
primacy as an economic sector. The crisis was dissociat-
ing the interests of the industrialists from the interests of
the workers. If industry was not able to provide jobs any
longer, why put up with its nefarious effects on the envi-
ronment? Second, the pollution of the Moselle had become
so severe in the 1960s that the downstream States had be-
gun to take exception to the situation. In 1963, France, Ger-
many and Luxembourg founded International Commissions
for the Protection of the Moselle and the Sarre against pollu-
tion. Even if the commissions action was curtailed by their
intergovernmental nature (until 1990, they were only a fo-
rum of discussion between governments), they were a symp-
tom of the political magnitude reached by the pollution prob-
lem of the Moselle and a channel through which downstream
States (and co-members of the European Economic Commu-
nity) exerted pressure on France. In the 1960s, the main issue
was organic pollution. However, in the 1970s, the priorities
changed and the question of salt discharges in the Meurthe
came to the forefront. That was linked to the heated de-
bate surrounding the salt content of the Rhine. In the 1970s,
the Moselle system contributed 27% to the French share of
chloride discharge in the Rhine (the remaining 73% came
from the potash mines in Alsace). The local administration
was extremely reluctant to take action against pollution and
the industrial consensus prevented pressures from the French
diplomacy to trickle down to either the prefect or the basin
agency. Overall, the situation was stalled and the sectoral
management principles inherited from the “planning” strat-
egy proved inadequate to deal with emerging pollution prob-
lems (e.g. diffuse pollution).
The main factor leading to a strategic turnaround in wa-
ter pollution management was the Sandoz accident in Basel
(Switzerland) on 1 November 1986. The water the firemen
used to put the fire out flowed to the Rhine, loaded with
chemicals. Fish in the river was eradicated, drawing large
media coverage and public attention. Marco Verweij has re-
lated the circumstances surrounding the endorsement of the
Rhine Action Program by all riparian States in 1987 (Ver-
weij, 1999, 2000). For the Moselle basin, the accident led
to the adoption of a new “international and environmental”
strategy that had two main consequences. The Rhine Action
Program was translated into regional objectives laid out by
the basin agency (1990). Pollution taxes rates were increased
by roughly 60% over a period of eight years. The pollution
discharges, already severely curtailed by the industrial cri-
sis, were further reduced (see Fig. 5). In the new strategy
(and in the new action program for the basin), the environ-
ment was given some consideration. It was a consequence
of the influence of the German and the Dutch examples and
the logical outcome of a national debate on the functions of
natural ecosystems (1990). Its conclusions were that some
tasks were better carried out and at a lesser cost by functional
ecosystems (e.g. wetlands) than by artificial means. Environ-
mental protection was not a matter of principles: it was based
on sound accounting.
4 Conclusions
In the second book of The Orator, Cicero extols the virtues
of history, “magistra vitae” (teacher of life). He probably did
not think of river management at the time but with a distance,
his expression is a good summary – mutatis mutandis – of
our argument. There is more to history than a mere remem-
brance of things past. An understanding of the forces that
have shaped the materiality and the images of river systems
is necessary to grasp river management in the past but also in
the present because historical structures have strong inertia.
This aspect is curiously absent from the literature on the en-
vironmental history of the twentieth century. In “Something
New under the Sun”, J. R. McNeill argues very convincingly
that the twentieth century saw environmental changes un-
matched in human history (McNeill, 2000). However, the
cultural “conditions of possibility” of such changes remain
somewhat elusive. McNeill shows that the “big ideas” (ide-
ologies that developed in the twentieth century) have had a
strong environmental impact, even if they were not specifi-
cally environmental per se. I think that an important factor
enabling environmental change in the twentieth century has
been the standing conferred to natural objects. It does not
only derive from very wide ethical and philosophical back-
grounds (as in Lynn White’s famous article on “The Histori-
cal Roots of Our Ecological Crisis”) or from McNeill’s “big
ideas” but also to very pragmatic cultural values invested in
forests, rivers, etc.
For the Moselle, the lesson to be learnt is that some mental
structures and power relations (what we termed “industrial
consensus”) have prevented the conception and implemen-
tation of successful pollution management strategies. This
analytical framework could explain environmental degrada-
tion in other settings and more specifically, in areas where
large concentrations of industrial activities can be found. It
has been shown that industrial consensus explained the high
level of air pollution in the Ruhr region (Uekoetter, 2002). In
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another example, the Yangtse river in China has undergone
massive changes in the last decade. It has been dammed
to prevent floods and enable irrigation, with severe conse-
quences on sediment transit. In the process, many local-
ities and historical sites of importance have been perma-
nently flooded, thus reneging on the cultural standing of the
river in Chinese culture. Human pressures on the river have
been compounded by heavy pollution and fishing (Diamond,
2004). As a consequence, in August 2007, new reports de-
clared that the Yangtze dolphin, locally known as “baiji”, had
gone extinct. It used to be a symbol of the river and an aus-
picious sign for fishermen. Such visible modifications of the
river environment express deep changes in the relationship
the Chinese society entertains with the river and the risks and
values connected to it.
There is a second lesson to be learnt for public environ-
mental management. The creation of formally democratic
and open forums in Lorraine (such as the basin commit-
tee) did not bring by itself an improvement of water qual-
ity in the basin. It means that policy initiatives cannot ignore
structural conditions that shape river basins’ functioning, im-
age and management. The case of the Moselle shows that
stakeholders’ participation will not necessarily produce an
environmentally optimal outcome and that consensus over
management principles is no indication of the desirability
of the principles themselves from an environmental point of
view. Caution is required in front of the calls for “integrated
management” and “stakeholder participation” in a drainage
basin when they ignore the reality of power relations and the
weight of historical structures.
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